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MENTAL DISABILITY LAW

Of Stereotypes and Stigma:Bear
Psychiatric
Hospitalization
Arms
and
Keep
to
and the Right
by Michael L. Perlin

United States Department of the Treasury,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
V.

Anthony J. Galioto
(Docket No. 84-1904)
Argued March 26, 1986

When the Supreme Court ruled last year that a municipal ordinance which effectively zoned out group
homes for the mentally retarded violated the Equal Protection Clause (City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Preview, 1984-85 term, pp. 41719), it looked carefully at the "irrational prejudice
against the mentally retarded" reflected by the legislation. Even though the Court declined to characterize the
retarded as a suspect class or to employ "intermediate
scrutiny," it looked at the law far more carefully than it
has traditionally done in other "rational basis" cases,
going out of its way to print out that fear and other
negative attitudes are not permissible bases for countenancing discriminatory treatment.

ISSUE
In Galioto, the Supreme Court is presented with a
different sort of equal protection claim raised by an
individual with a history of a different sort of mental
disability in a fact context which appears significantly
removed from the group home in Cleburne, Texas: the
constitutionality of those provisions in Title IV of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (as
amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968) (Title IV).
The questioned provisions: 1) prohibit any individual
"who has been adjudicated a mental defective or who
has been committed to any mental institution" from
receiving a firearm in interstate commerce; 2) prohibit a
federal firearms licensee from selling a firearm to such a
person, and 3) provide no administrative mechanism by
which this disability may be alleviated or lifted (in contrast to a statutory section which provides for such relief
in the case of other groups of individuals otherwise
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prohibited from so purchasing a gun, including certain
convicted felons).
While there are many striking differences between
Calioto and Cleburne-types of disability, current existence of the disability, the subject matter being regulated,
intensity of public opinion-the current case will give
the Court its first opportunity to apply Cleburneto one of
the many areas in which a permanent civil disability may
be statutorily imposed because of a history of mental
disability. The importance of Galioto, in short, far transcends the facts and narrow statutory base of the case.
FACTS
On May 11, 1971, Anthony Galioto voluntarily entered Fair Oaks hospital, a private psychiatric facility in
Summit, New Jersey, where he was diagnosed as having
experienced "an acute, schizophrenic episode with paranoid features" but he was found by his treating physician (Dr. Alvarez) to be "not acutely psychotic or
suicidal, and [not considered] dangerous to himself or
others." About three weeks after his admission, Galioto
served the hospital with notice of his intention to leave
prior to discharge; at this time, the hospital sought his
involuntary commitment, and he was so committed on
May 31, 1971. Five days later, he was discharged as
improved by the same doctor who had filed the involuntary commitment papers. Galioto has not been hospitalized or treated for mental disorder since this 1971
episode.
In 1981, Galioto obtained a New Jersey Firearms
Purchaser Identification Card after Dr. Alvarez certified
(in keeping with state law, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:58-3.c.3)
that he was no longer suffering from a mental disability
"that would interfere with or handicap him in the handling of firearms." In October of 1982, Galioto applied
to the Department of Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), seeking relief from the
disability that followed from his commitment; he included in his application another statement by Dr. Alvarez that he "was no longer suffering from any mental
disability that would interfere with his handling of firearms." In April, 1984, BATF denied his application for
relief.
Galioto then filed suit in the federal District Court of
New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of the permanent ban on firearms possession imposed by federal
law, arguing that the statutory availability of administrative relief to felons and barring such relief to persons
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once committed to mental institutions violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
The court granted summary judgment to Galioto,
declaring unconstitutional those portions of Title IV
which deprived him of the ability to purchase a firearm
without affording him the opportunity to contest that
disability (602 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1985)). After determining that the mentally ill are a "quasi-suspect class"
for purposes of equal protection analysis (thus deserving
"intensified intermediate scrutiny"), the court found
that the provisions in question were wholly irrational
(and thus, presumably, would have failed constitutional
muster under the more lenient "rational basis" test),
noting that any such permanent ban would have been
"more logically applied to convicts than to mental
patients."
The court premised its finding on three factors: 1)
Felons have already demonstrated that they are capable
of criminal activity, while former mental patients may
have indicated nothing more than a propensity for disruptive, non-criminal behavior; 2) Since patients are
unlikely to appeal commitment orders, "the propriety of
the original commitment may never be fully explored,"
and 3) Commitment procedures, which have fewer due
process protections than do criminal trials, "are replete
with erroneous factual findings." The distinction between felons and mental patients in the federal law, the
court reasoned, must have been based upon outdated
notions that ignored "expanding knowledge about the
causes of mental illnesses, their reversibility and treatment."
In addition, the court alternatively held that the challenged provisions violated due process standards because they denied former patients the opportunity to
establish that they no longer present the danger against
which the statute was intended to guard, creating "an
irrebuttable presumption that one who has been committed, no matter what the circumstance, is forever
mentally ill and dangerous." Such a presumption is irrational, it found, because, "without any good faith extrinsic justification, ... it relies on psychiatric evidence
introduced in one proceeding to impose a burden on an
individual, and then refuses to accept the same evidence
when the individual seeks to have the burden removed."
Although the court specified that it did not find that
statutes generally prohibiting mental patients from purchasing firearms were irrational (in that they served a
legitimate and substantial state objective), it found the
provisions in question irrational and unconstitutional
because they failed to include "some provision for the
granting of relief from disability to former mental patients in appropriate cases." Since the court felt it did not
have the competence to make such prophylactic relief
available, it declared unconstitutional those provisions
of Title IV "which have been used to deprive [Galioto]
of his ability to purchase a firearm."
Issue No. 12

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
As can be expected, BATF and Galioto present this
case through entirely different filters: BATF focuses on
Congress's broad powers to control firearms abuse; Galioto centers on the immutability of his prior commitment and the irrebutability of the statutory
presumption. They also differ sharply on what the New
Jersey standard for commitment was when Galioto was
hospitalized and the significance which can be imputed
to that commitment now (an issue looked at closely by
joint amicus, the New Jersey Department of the Public
Advocate and the Amei ican Civil Liberties Union of
NewJersey.
Other amici (all in support of Galioto) raise other
issues of broad social policy significance: amicus Coalition for the Fundamental Rights and Equality of ExPatients (FREE), (an umbrella coalition numbering mental health citizens' advocacy groups and ex-patient selfhelp groups) argues that the absolute statutory bar is a
"classic example of the irrational discrimination that still
exists against many former patients' fundamental
rights" and that ex-patients, like all other Americans, are
entitled to the "fundamental right to keep and bear
arms." Also, amicus American Psychological Association
(APA) argues that the "central issue in the case is Congress' use of false stereotypes to impose a permanent
civil disability" on formerly hospitalized mentally disordered persons.
BATF suggests that it was "entirely reasonable" for
Congress to exclude from federal firearms commerce
persons with a history of mental illness-a category of
"presumptively dangerous persons" (Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 (1980))-along with persons who
have been dishonorably discharged from the Armed
Forces and those who have renounced American citizenship. The legislative determination that membership in this group predicts a potential for future
criminal behavior, according to BATF, is entitled to
"substantial deference," especially because the "subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties
virtually beyond reach" (Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 430 (1979)). A history of commitment is thus a
''reasonable trigger" for the legislative restrictions.
In addition, BATF suggests that the administrative
relief offered to certain felons is the statutory exception,
not the rule. Other felons (those who have committed
firearms offenses or crimes involving weapons), dishonorable dischargees and citizenship renouncers are similarly barred from such relief. The exception in question
was added to the law, the government argues, when it
became apparent that diversified manufacturing conglomerates convicted of white collar crimes in areas
unrelated to their firearms divisions (as happened in a
celebrated case to the Olin-Matheson Chemical Corporation) would be subsequently permanently barred
from the interstate shipment of arms.
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Finally, BATF argues that it was not irrational for
Congress to premise this exclusion on the fact of commitment, even if there are "subsequent curative events,"
as commitment may only be ordered "in the presence of
clear and convincing evidence that the individual presents a danger to himself or others" (citing Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563,576 (1975)).
On the other hand, Galioto stresses that former mental patients (many of whom have been institutionalized
for behaviors no longer considered to reflect mental
illness) "have been saddled with stereotypical concepts
of irrational behavior and violence," which, along with
the stigma of overgeneralization and the immutability of
the commitment record, have "generated fear and mistrust of former mental patients in the general population long after discharge from the hospital." Thus, he
concludes, quasi-suspect status is appropriate for purposes of equal protection analysis.
If, however, the court does not choose to apply this
test, Galioto urges that the statute should fall under the
rational basis test, due to: 1) its employment of a classification based on the commitment procedure (based on
psychiatric opinion) and its concomitant refusal to accept the same opinion to relieve the disability, and 2) its
use of the history of commitment-a determination often made without any procedural due process protections-as the "triggering" mechanism.
Here the factual disputes are most sharply drawn.
BATF is simply wrong, Galioto asserts, in suggesting
that the 1971 commitment somehow met the standards
for commitment set out in the Donaldson case (which was
not even decided until 1975). Substantively, dangerousness was not a commitment criteria in New Jersey in
1971; commitments were then countenanced on a find-

ing of mental illness alone. Procedurally, pre-1975 commitments in New Jersey were ex parte, without testimony
or any independent evidence other than the doctor's
certification of mental illness, and without notice, appointment of counsel and an opportunity for the patient
to be heard.
ARGUMENTS
For the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms(Counsel,
Charles A. Rothfeld, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; telephone (202) 633-2217)
1. Congress acted constitutionally and rationally in prohibiting persons with "a proven history of mental
illness" from obtaining firearms and in imposing permanent firearms disabilities on such persons; heightened scrutiny is inappropriate in such cases.
ForAnthony J. Galioto (Counsel of Record, Michael Casale,
575 Kingsland Street, Nutley, NJ 07110; telephone (201)
667-8500)
1. Former mental patients are a suspect class; the statutory scheme is unconstitutional both facially and
applied under an equal protection analysis. In addition, the statutory scheme is a deprivation of substantive due process.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In support ofAnthonyJ. Galioto
As indicated above, the New Jersey Department of
Public Advocate, joined by the American Civil Liberties
Union of NewJersey; the Coalition for the Fundamental
Rights and Equality of Ex-Patients; and the American
Psychological Association all filed briefs supporting
Galioto.
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